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Editor's Introduction: Epistemic Boundaries
Abstract
As science studies scholars, one of our basic tasks is to draw the boundaries that will define our units of
inquiry and constrain the chronological and geographical limits of our studies. Without these boundaries, the
categories of our analysis remain imprecise. Fortunately, we now have an extensive toolkit to help us with this
task. With paradigms, research programs, epistemic cultures, or styles of reasoning, historians, philosophers,
and sociologists of science now have a large set of resources for locating the fissures and discontinuities in
science. The papers from the focused discussion of this issue of Spontaneous Generations present us with an
opportunity to take a step back and examine the ways that science studies scholars are currently drawing
boundaries. In reviewing the articles for this discussion, our aim as editors was to reflect on what boundaries
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As science studies scholars, one of our basic tasks is to draw
the boundaries that will define our units of inquiry and constrain the
chronological and geographical limits of our studies. Without these
boundaries, the categories of our analysis remain imprecise. Fortunately,
we now have an extensive toolkit to help us with this task. With
paradigms, research programs, epistemic cultures, or styles of reasoning,
historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science now have a large
set of resources for locating the fissures and discontinuities in science.
The papers from the focused discussion of this issue of Spontaneous
Generations present us with an opportunity to take a step back and
examine the ways that science studies scholars are currently drawing
boundaries. In reviewing the articles for this discussion, our aim as editors
was to reflect on what boundaries scholars were paying attention to and
what use we can make of these boundaries.
Our first set of papers (Niemoczynski, Lehoux, Aikin et al.) probe
one of the most fundamental boundaries in the scientific enterprise:
the border between the natural and the supernatural. In these papers,
this boundary proves difficult to locate, yet charged with political and
philosophical consequences. The papers in the second set (Delbourgo,
Ottinger, Gooday) ask how boundaries are illuminated when we focus
on objects and artifacts. The objects in these studies resist definition,
revealing social, cultural and practical epistemic boundaries. The next
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two papers (Wright, Baus) look at what happens at the formation of new
epistemic communities, tracing boundaries as they blur, shift and reform.
Finally, our last papers (Levina, Wald) ask how we can understand the
nature of epistemic disagreements. Are there times when we should agree
to disagree?
I. THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND NOT-SCIENCE
Thomas Gieryn (1983; 1995) has argued that we should move
away from using universal demarcation criteria for drawing boundaries.
Rather than generating normative theories about how to draw epistemic
boundaries between science and non-science, Gieryn suggests that we
look at how boundaries between science and pseudo-science have been
historically constructed and the ways in which these boundaries have
been put to use by scientists trying to secure resources and credibility
while denying them to others. For Gieryn, the question of how to draw
boundaries between science and non-science is primarily a sociological
one rather than a philosophical one.
However, framing the demarcation problem as a sociological rather
than philosophical problem should not imply that philosophy has nothing
interesting to say about epistemic boundaries. In this volume, for example,
LEON NIEMOCZYNSKI suggests a way that philosophy can make an
important contribution to our discussions of the boundaries of science. In
his article, Niemoczynski scrutinizes the epistemology of twentieth century
American naturalists like Dewey, Quine, and Santayana, and argues
that their conflation of the natural with the physical restricts the kinds
of questions science and philosophy can ask and leads to reductionist
accounts of human experience. The problem with this kind of naturalism,
Niemoczynski argues, is that proponents are “so intent on denying the
supernatural that it actually ends up unnecessarily excluding the abstract
components of experience that clearly can and do contribute to knowledge
(knowledge of the self or knowledge of the ideal laws that govern
the universe, for example)” (Niemoczynski, 18). Instead, Niemoczynski
recommends a strain of naturalism espoused by the early twentieth
century philosopher Justus Buchler, who argues that ideal entities and
phenomenological events deserve the same status as sense data when
we provide descriptions of the natural world. Niemoczynski’s argument
suggests, then, that ontological commitments about the natural orient and
shape what we consider knowable and can thus inform the epistemic
boundaries that scientists adopt. What is considered natural serves as a
constitutive boundary.
Whereas Niemoczynski looks to expand the boundary of what is
considered natural, DARYN LEHOUX argues that there is no clear boundary
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that marks the birth of naturalistic thought within the history of science. In
received accounts, we are told that creation myths give way to naturalistic
explanations with the Presocratics and the subsequent birth of Western
philosophy. Lehoux argues, however, that there are many difficulties
with this simple narrative. There is good reason to believe that Plato,
Aristotle, and the Presocratics took their creation myths quite seriously;
further, we can point to practices that predate the Presocratics, like
agriculture and domestic breeding, as areas of knowledge that surely
require some kind of understanding of natural causes. For Lehoux, then,
the birth-of-naturalism narrative represents an epistemic boundary that
is artificially imposed by the historian rather than a boundary that helps
us make sense of how the ancients understood their world. Whereas
many historians and philosophers in the Anglo-American world have
sought to draw a well-defined boundary that designates the birth of
naturalism, Lehoux suggests that we should approach the ancients as
anthropologists approach foreign cultures and try to understand what the
ancients themselves understood by the natural.
Both Niemoczynski and Lehoux present arguments for broadening
the scope of what we consider natural. Niemoczynski argues that we
should include non-physical phenomena, such as ideal objects and private
phenomenological experiences, whereas Lehoux proposes that there is
no reason to think that cultures that have creation myths do not also have
intricate knowledge of natural causes. SCOTT AIKIN, MICHAEL HARBOUR,
and ROBERT B. TALISSE contribute to this discussion by teasing out
some policy implications of the way the boundaries between the natural
and the supernatural are drawn. Aikin et al. respond to Thomas Nagel’s
argument that there is no principled way to demarcate between science
and non-science when we are talking about evolution versus intelligent
design (ID). For Nagel, we either have to consider both evolution and ID
as science or both as non-science. However, according to Aikin et al.,
the policy implication of treating ID and evolution symmetrically is that
we should give both equal time in the science classroom. Thus, Aikin et
al. issue a word of caution–if we want to expand our boundaries of what
we count as natural or scientific we should be mindful of the politics and
practical implications behind such a move.
II. OBJECTS AT THE BOUNDARIES
Where philosophers like Karl Popper once sought to draw a single firm
line separating science and non-science, science studies scholars now
talk about a multitude of boundaries in flux. Once-firm boundaries, like
those between science and the public, and between religion and science,
have become increasingly difficult to pin down, and new boundaries within
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science itself have emerged. In this new picture, science is undefinable
and fundamentally disunified. One way to investigate these boundaries is
to focus on their material dimensions and ask whether and how particular
instruments and objects of study define distinct epistemic communities.
Disciplinary boundaries in science have always been, at least partly,
ontological; at first pass a biologist differs from a physicist primarily in the
objects of her gaze. But to what extent are these boundaries epistemic as
well (Knorr-Cetina 1999)? And do particular objects or instruments compel
particular epistemic norms? Or can the same instrument operate within
very different epistemic contexts (as Daston and Galison [2008] argue
was the case with the camera)? And, if so, should we be satisfied with
the compromise offered by the idea of a “boundary object,” that is able
to “inhabit several social worlds. . . both plastic enough to adapt to local
needs. . . yet robust enough to maintain a common identify across sites”
(Star and Griesemer 1989, 393)?
JAMES DELBOURGO emphasizes the epistemic instability of objects as
they move across boundaries. He follows the trajectories of two particular
objects of curiosity at the turn of the eighteenth century as they crossed the
colonial divide into Europe. Delbourgo argues that in order to understand
the historical meaning of an object, we must pay attention not just to
the boundaries that are being crossed but also to the particular modes
of transfer. In the case of one of these objects, a Chinese cabinet of
surgical instruments, this means uncovering the contingent nature of its
path to the collector. By emphasizing the weakness of the collector, his
inability to exert complete control over the choice of items in his collection
or to convince others of the worth of these collected objects, Delbourgo
highlights the multiple identities embodied by this single object.
GWEN OTTINGER asks whether a new, shared instrument can bring
previously separate epistemic communities together. She looks at two
communities–residents and experts–both monitoring air quality along an
oil refinery fenceline in Louisiana. These groups have traditionally used
different instruments and different methods to collect air quality data,
disagreeing over the significance of each other’s results. The hope that
a new, shared type of fenceline monitor would bridge this epistemic divide
has not, however, played out. She finds the old boundaries reproduced in
the ways that each community approaches the new measuring device.
In his study of early twentieth-century research into permanent
magnets, GRAEME GOODAY highlights the social-industrial boundary
of trade-secrecy that acted as an epistemic boundary preventing the
dissemination of knowledge. This commitment to secrecy was challenged
by Marie Curie, who published some of the first comprehensive research
on the properties of these magnets. Like Delbourgo’s Chinese cabinet
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and Ottinger’s fenceline monitors, the permanent magnets at the heart
of Gooday’s study resist definition. But where the previous authors
highlight the socio-cultural reasons for this resistance, Gooday points, in
addition, to theoretical and practical boundaries that constrain researcher’s
attempts to achieve permanence. The boundary imposed by trade secrecy
was ultimately overcome, but the quest for permanence proved to be
unachievable.
III. COMMUNITY FORMATION
The objects in the previous studies illuminated boundaries already
firmly in place. AARON SIDNEY WRIGHT, however, follows a boundary in
motion by focusing on astronomer Matthew Fontaine Maury and his efforts
to train a new community of nineteenth-century American navigators to
perform trustworthy meteorological observations for sea charts. Wright
focuses in particular on the work done by the standardized log sheets
distributed to these new observers. These log sheets did exactly what
Ottinger’s new fenceline monitors couldn’t: Wright argues that they began
“erasing the boundary they sat on” (91). The log sheets helped to introduce
these thousands of American navigators into an already existing epistemic
community of trained astronomical observers.
But we still might wonder about the particular dynamics of this
epistemic conversion. What cultural practices did these new observers
bring with them to the established community of astronomers? Was the
conversion of these new observers complete? Or could elements of this
process be understood using the idea of a trading zone (Galison 1997), in
which the log sheets might function as a type of creole?
DANIELA BAUS argues that scholars studying the formation of new
epistemic communities can benefit from analytical tools borrowed from
anthropology. These include the idea of creolization, the process by which
new languages and cultural practices develop as formerly distinct cultures
intermix, and the idea of the hybrid, the notion that every individual’s
identity is in fact fractured. Using these concepts, Baus asks us to
examine four complementary dimensions of the formation of new scientific
communities: the construction of a communicative space, the formation of
new institutions, the flow of symbols in the form of texts and instruments,
and the migration of individual scientists between communities.
IV. DISAGREEMENT
Encounters between epistemic communities are not always moments
of convergence. Often epistemic boundaries have to be negotiated when
communities with different epistemic standards interact. The interaction
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of separate communities raises interesting questions about the nature
of disagreements. Can alternative spaces be built where the epistemic
authority of experts stands on equal footing with that of the public? Are
there times when disagreement is necessary and productive?
MARINA LEVINA focuses on the disagreements that arose in the
blogosphere in response to the presentation of alternative medical
treatments on The Oprah Winfrey Show. Levina takes issue with media
criticism of Oprah that relies on a strict demarcation between science
and popular culture, where science is said to hold the upper hand in the
creation of knowledge. Instead she interprets the Oprah Winfrey Show as
an alternative space where the distinct epistemic practices of scientists
and the public can interact and where scientists do not necessarily retain
the epistemic authority granted to them by their institutions. Like Baus, who
describes the convergence of epistemic communities and examines tools
for interpreting the formation of new epistemic spaces, Levina moves away
from an examination of boundaries from within epistemic communities and
focuses on how boundaries are negotiated when communities interact.
On the other hand, BENJAMIN WALD considers situations when
recognizing and maintaining epistemic boundaries is both rational
and productive. In his discussion of epistemic disagreements, Wald
distinguishes between two kinds of epistemic peers: epistemic peers who
share evidentiary standards and therefore reason in similar ways, and
peers who reason very differently but appear equally knowledgeable. In
disagreements with peers of the first sort, Wald argues that it is rational to
suspend one’s judgment, whereas with peers of the second sort he argues
that it is rational to maintain one’s position. For Wald, disagreements with
our remotest peers provide an opportunity to re-consider and evaluate
our own epistemic standards and beliefs in order to examine why we find
them convincing. For Wald, in cases where epistemic boundaries seem
insurmountable but borne from equally rigorous considerations, the best
strategy is to respectfully disagree.
V. MOVING FORWARD
Historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science have always paid
attention to boundaries, but the boundaries of the past were fewer and
more clearly marked. We now have a multitude of flexible boundaries, and
it seems, no shared language for talking about them. As we continue to
refine the models we deploy to make sense of changing epistemic norms,
of moments of contact between competing knowledge cultures, and of
the ways in which boundaries are shaped by discipline, by geography,
and through language and practice, a number of important problems
emerge. We should ask, for instance, what makes some boundaries more
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permeable than others and what features allow certain epistemic cultures
to be more resistant to change? Or is it the case that all epistemic
commitments are equally malleable? What happens if we begin to consider
the ways in which power dynamics affect communication between two
separate cultures (Collins et al. 2007)? And how do we find a way to talk
productively about these cultures, when we know, on closer inspection,
that they are far from homogeneous themselves?
The idea of epistemic boundaries is undoubtedly a powerful metaphor,
but one requiring reflexive scrutiny. As an epistemic tool of our trade,
boundaries delimit our research projects, frame our perspective and
determine our stance. As students of science, we must attend to the
boundaries we draw.
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